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„THE RED CELL PROJECT
The Red Cell was a small unit created by the CIA after 9/11 to ensure the analytic failure of missing the attacks would never be repeated. It produced short briefs intended to spur out-of-the-box thinking on flawed assumptions and misperceptions about the world, encouraging alternative policy thinking. At another pivotal time of increasing uncertainty, this project is intended as an open-source version, using a similar format to question outmoded mental maps and “strategic empathy” to discern the motives and constraints of other global actors, enhancing the possibility of more effective strategies.
The United States and its allies are currently debating the merits of applying the so-called “Israel model” to Ukraine. The idea is both promising and deceptively simple: provide Ukraine with some combination of arms sales, security commitments, and military training that would enable the country — in a similar way to Israel — to deter and defend against future Russian aggression without the full risks of NATO membership. Though Israel-like security guarantees would help policymakers to avoid the politically thorny questions of Ukraine’s NATO accession, they are not without risks. The US-Israel relationship shows that the more credible the U.S. commitment to Israel has become, the more that Israeli leaders have come to believe that Washington will always be there to bail them out. As a result, the relationship has become plagued by the challenges of entrapment. Over time, the United States has found it harder to achieve its own strategic goals, which increasingly diverge from those of Israel.
What Exactly is the “Israel Model”?
The Israel model was not an intentional policy choice. Over time, however, growing U.S. support for Israel ultimately evolved into a policy of security guarantees, strong political backing, and large arms transfers. U.S. support did not start with the creation of the state of Israel, as many assume. The United States did not start arming Israel until the 1960s, and it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that specific written security guarantees transformed that relationship into an informal strategic alliance. Those decisions resulted from realpolitik logic rather than moral or ideological imperatives, and the domestically powerful pro-Israel lobby often associated with the relationship did not emerge until later decades. Instead, the relationship was founded on Israel’s value as an ally in the Cold War. Closer ties with Israel served to achieve larger goals: containing Soviet power and influence in the Middle East and establishing a US-led regional order.
The Israel model evolved against this strategic backdrop and developed three defining features:
Israel is not a formal treaty ally but a “quasi-ally” of the United States. The United States and Israel have never entered a treaty alliance with Article 5-style mutual defense obligations. But the close ties between the two countries have cemented into something more than a transactional relationship. As President John F. Kennedy told Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir in 1962, “The United States has a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East, really comparable only to that which it has with Britain over a wide range of world affairs.” U.S. and Israeli leaders have continuously reaffirmed the notion of an “unbreakable bond” between the two countries, citing “shared values, shared interests, and true friendship,” that other countries — friends and foes alike — have also acknowledged.
Notwithstanding the lack of a formal treaty commitment, the United States has provided written security guarantees to Israel. In 1975, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding in which Washington pledged a “long-standing U.S. commitment to the survival and security of Israel,” to include every U.S. “effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an ongoing and long-term basis, to Israel’s military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements, and to its economic needs.” Four years later, coinciding with the Camp David Accords, the United States committed to providing Israel with “support it deems appropriate” in the event of violations to the peace.
An additional Memorandum of Understanding, signed in 1981, established the institutional machinery for closer US-Israel cooperation through the Joint-Political Military Planning Group, the Joint Security Assistance Planning Group, and the Joint Economic Development Group. Taken together, these agreements effectively extended security guarantees to Israel, stressing America’s long-term commitment to the country.
U.S. security guarantees to Israel are not binding, but as a practical matter, all of America’s treaty commitments are ambiguous. NATO’s Article 5, for instance, requires members to take “necessary” action to support an ally if it is attacked, but it does not place members under any legal obligation to fight directly. This distinction matters: though the Biden administration often refers to the U.S. commitment to Article 5 as an “ironclad commitment,” Article 5 does not make U.S. military involvement automatic. As a result, the credibility of U.S. security guarantees — both those given to Israel and NATO countries alike — comes down to deeds, not words. From the start, the U.S. security guarantees to Israel aimed to keep Washington at arm’s length, and thus avoid alienating Arab countries, while the U.S. commitment to NATO always presumed a direct U.S. combat role.“
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