…
\n…
\n…
\n„3. The Regions
\nIt has become customary for documents such as this to mention every part of the
\nworld and issue, on the assumption that any oversight signifies a blind spot or a
\nsnub. As a result, such documents become bloated and unfocused\u2014the opposite of
\nwhat a strategy should be.
\nTo focus and prioritize is to choose\u2014to acknowledge that not everything matters
\nequally, to everyone. It is not to assert that any peoples, regions, or countries are
\nsomehow intrinsically unimportant. The United States is by every measure the
\nmost generous nation in history\u2014yet we cannot afford to be equally attentive to
\nevery region and every problem in the world.
\nThe purpose of national security policy is the protection of core national
\ninterests\u2014some priorities transcend regional confines. For instance, terrorist
\nactivity in an otherwise less consequential area might force our urgent attention.
\nBut leaping from that necessity to sustained attention to the periphery is a mistake.
\nA. Western Hemisphere: The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
\nAfter years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe
\nDoctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to
\nprotect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We
\nwill deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other
\nthreatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our
\nHemisphere. This \u201cTrump Corollary\u201d to the Monroe Doctrine is a common-sense
\nand potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American
\nsecurity interests.
\n15
\nOur goals for the Western Hemisphere can be summarized as \u201cEnlist and Expand.\u201d
\nWe will enlist established friends in the Hemisphere to control migration, stop drug
\nflows, and strengthen stability and security on land and sea. We will expand by
\ncultivating and strengthening new partners while bolstering our own nation\u2019s
\nappeal as the Hemisphere\u2019s economic and security partner of choice.
\nEnlist
\nAmerican policy should focus on enlisting regional champions that can help create
\ntolerable stability in the region, even beyond those partners\u2019 borders. These nations
\nwould help us stop illegal and destabilizing migration, neutralize cartels, near
\nshore manufacturing, and develop local private economies, among other things. We
\nwill reward and encourage the region\u2019s governments, political parties, and
\nmovements broadly aligned with our principles and strategy. But we must not
\noverlook governments with different outlooks with whom we nonetheless share
\ninterests and who want to work with us.
\nThe United States must reconsider our military presence in the Western
\nHemisphere. This means four obvious things:
\n\u2022 A readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in
\nour Hemisphere, especially the missions identified in this strategy, and away
\nfrom theaters whose relative import to American national security has
\ndeclined in recent decades or years;
\n\u2022 A more suitable Coast Guard and Navy presence to control sea lanes, to
\nthwart illegal and other unwanted migration, to reduce human and drug
\ntrafficking, and to control key transit routes in a crisis;
\n\u2022 Targeted deployments to secure the border and defeat cartels, including
\nwhere necessary the use of lethal force to replace the failed law
\nenforcement-only strategy of the last several decades; and
\n\u2022 Establishing or expanding access in strategically important locations.
\nThe United States will prioritize commercial diplomacy, to strengthen our own
\neconomy and industries, using tariffs and reciprocal trade agreements as powerful
\ntools. The goal is for our partner nations to build up their domestic economies,
\nwhile an economically stronger and more sophisticated Western Hemisphere
\nbecomes an increasingly attractive market for American commerce and investment.
\n16
\nStrengthening critical supply chains in this Hemisphere will reduce dependencies
\nand increase American economic resilience. The linkages created between America
\nand our partners will benefit both sides while making it harder for non
\nHemispheric competitors to increase their influence in the region. And even as we
\nprioritize commercial diplomacy, we will work to strengthen our security
\npartnerships\u2014from weapons sales to intelligence sharing to joint exercises.
\nExpand
\nAs we deepen our partnerships with countries with whom America presently has
\nstrong relations, we must look to expand our network in the region. We want other
\nnations to see us as their partner of first choice, and we will (through various
\nmeans) discourage their collaboration with others.
\nThe Western Hemisphere is home to many strategic resources that America should
\npartner with regional allies to develop, to make neighboring countries as well as
\nour own more prosperous. The National Security Council will immediately begin a
\nrobust interagency process to task agencies, supported by our Intelligence
\nCommunity\u2019s analytical arm, to identify strategic points and resources in the
\nWestern Hemisphere with a view to their protection and joint development with
\nregional partners.
\nNon-Hemispheric competitors have made major inroads into our Hemisphere, both
\nto disadvantage us economically in the present, and in ways that may harm us
\nstrategically in the future. Allowing these incursions without serious pushback is
\nanother great American strategic mistake of recent decades.
\nThe United States must be preeminent in the Western Hemisphere as a condition of
\nour security and prosperity\u2014a condition that allows us to assert ourselves
\nconfidently where and when we need to in the region. The terms of our alliances,
\nand the terms upon which we provide any kind of aid, must be contingent on
\nwinding down adversarial outside influence\u2014from control of military installations,
\nports, and key infrastructure to the purchase of strategic assets broadly defined.
\nSome foreign influence will be hard to reverse, given the political alignments
\nbetween certain Latin American governments and certain foreign actors. However,
\nmany governments are not ideologically aligned with foreign powers but are
\ninstead attracted to doing business with them for other reasons, including low costs
\n17
\nand fewer regulatory hurdles. The United States has achieved success in rolling
\nback outside influence in the Western Hemisphere by demonstrating, with
\nspecificity, how many hidden costs\u2014in espionage, cybersecurity, debt-traps, and
\nother ways\u2014are embedded in allegedly \u201clow cost\u201d foreign assistance. We should
\naccelerate these efforts, including by utilizing U.S. leverage in finance and
\ntechnology to induce countries to reject such assistance.
\nIn the Western Hemisphere\u2014and everywhere in the world\u2014the United States
\nshould make clear that American goods, services, and technologies are a far better
\nbuy in the long run, because they are higher quality and do not come with the same
\nkind of strings as other countries\u2019 assistance. That said, we will reform our own
\nsystem to expedite approvals and licensing\u2014again, to make ourselves the partner
\nof first choice. The choice all countries should face is whether they want to live in
\nan American-led world of sovereign countries and free economies or in a parallel
\none in which they are influenced by countries on the other side of the world.
\nEvery U.S. official working in or on the region must be up to speed on the full
\npicture of detrimental outside influence while simultaneously applying pressure
\nand offering incentives to partner countries to protect our Hemisphere.
\nSuccessfully protecting our Hemisphere also requires closer collaboration between
\nthe U.S. Government and the American private sector. All our embassies must be
\naware of major business opportunities in their country, especially major
\ngovernment contracts. Every U.S. Government official that interacts with these
\ncountries should understand that part of their job is to help American companies
\ncompete and succeed.
\nThe U.S. Government will identify strategic acquisition and investment
\nopportunities for American companies in the region and present these opportunities
\nfor assessment by every U.S. Government financing program, including but not
\nlimited to those within the Departments of State, War, and Energy; the Small
\nBusiness Administration; the International Development Finance Corporation; the
\nExport-Import Bank; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. We should also
\npartner with regional governments and businesses to build scalable and resilient
\nenergy infrastructure, invest in critical mineral access, and harden existing and
\nfuture cyber communications networks that take full advantage of American
\n18
\nencryption and security potential. The aforementioned U.S. Government entities
\nshould be used to finance some of the costs of purchasing U.S. goods abroad.
\nThe United States must also resist and reverse measures such as targeted taxation,
\nunfair regulation, and expropriation that disadvantage U.S. businesses. The terms
\nof our agreements, especially with those countries that depend on us most and
\ntherefore over which we have the most leverage, must be sole-source contracts for
\nour companies. At the same time, we should make every effort to push out foreign
\ncompanies that build infrastructure in the region.“
\n…
\n…
\n…<\/p>\n
https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/12\/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
… … … „3. The Regions It has become customary for documents such as this to mention every part of the world and issue, on the assumption that any oversight signifies a blind spot or a snub. As a result, such documents become bloated and unfocused\u2014the opposite of what a strategy should be. To focus … <\/p>\n